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July 12, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 810681 
THE SEVEN-POINT PROPOSAL 
OFTHENLF 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, over 
the past 10 days I have had a chance to 
study in detail the proposals made by 
Madame Binh, the chairman of the dele-
gation of the National Liberation Front, 
which evidently have the full support of 
Xuan Thuy, the chairman of ~he North 
Vietnamese delegation. These pro)X>sals 
have been made with the obvious ap-
proval and, perhaps, at the instigation of 
Le Due Tho, a member of the ruling 
committee in Hanoi who has returned to 
Parts after a 14-month absence. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
. sent that the seven-point proposal as 
outlined in brief in the UPI dispatch 
dated July 1, 1971, be printed in the 
RECORD. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. AL-
LEN). Without objection, it is so ordered. 
The proposal, ordered to be printed in 
the RECORD, is as follows: 
1. A cease-fire between Communist and 
American forces as soon as the two sides 
reach agreement on the withdrawal of non-
South VIetnamese troops. 
2. A cease-fire between the Communist 
and South VIetnamese forces as soon as the 
VIetnamese belligerents In the South agree 
on the creation of a provisional trlpartie 
government In Saigon whose main task 
would be organizing general elections. 
3. The problem of VIetnamese armed 
forces, clearly meaning the presence In the 
South of large North VIetnamese forces, will 
be settled by the Vietnamese themselves. 
4. The VIet Cong said that following re-
establishment of peace, the country's re-
unification would be negotiated by the two 
zones without outside Interference, with 
both South and North refusing to join any 
mU!tary alliances with outsiders, or allow-
Ing them to set up foreign bases. 
5. A pacified South VIetnam, oofore Its re-
unification with North VIetnam, would set 
up relations with all countries Including the 
United States. 
6. The U.S. would be held liable to pay an 
Indemnification "for the losses and the de-
structions It has caused to the VIetnamese 
people In the two zones." 
7. According to the document "the parties 
will find agreement on the forms of re-
spect and International guarantee of the ac-
cords that will be concluded." 
Mr. MANSFIELD. M;r. President, it ap-
pears to me that the seven-point state-
ment, for the first time, contains ele-
ments of a breakthrough in the impasse 
which had marked, previously, the 118 
meetings in Paris. The statement calls 
for a cease-fire and a mutual agreement 
based on the phased withdrawal of Amer-
ican troops-which, in any event, has 
been the aim of this Government for the 
last two and a half years-and. concur-
rently, the release of U.S. POW's which 
is also the basic aim of ·the administra-
tion. 
As fo;r the problem of the Vietnamese 
armed forces, it is proposed that settle-
ment be by the Vietnamese themselves. 
It is also proposed that Vietnamese alone 
work out the problem of reunification. 
The statement notes that after a U.S. 
withdrawal, South Vietnam would be 
prepared to establish relations with all 
countries including the United States, an 
indication that some form of independ-
ence is envisioned at least into the in-
determinate future. That point seems to 
be reinforced in point No. 7 which 
states-
Parties will find agreement on the forms of 
respect and International guarantee of the 
accords that will be concluded. 
Proposal No.2 in the seven-point state-
ment is indeterminate as to meaning. It 
refers to the question of an interim tri-
partite government, and the organizing 
of general elections. Presumably, negoti-
ations could serve to clarify the implica-
tions of this point. 
Proposal No. 6 relative to U.S. liability 
to pay an indemnity for thP. losses and 
the destruction it has caused to the Viet-
namese people in the two zones clearly, 
is open to question. 
This is the matter which the distin-
guished minority leader earlier this mor-
ning addressed himself to primarily. If 
the Binh statement were transposed-
this particular language--into a postwar 
effort at joint rehabilitation and re-
construction, however, it might well be 
subject to negotiation. 
In any event, my overall reaction to 
Madam Blnh's statement is that it con-
stitutes, for the first time, a substantial 
proposal. The talks at Paris-there have 
been no negotiations as yet-have been 
moved off dead center. Indeed, we may be 
seeing, at last, a real possibility in the 
outworn phrase "light at the end of the 
tunnel." 
I can appreciate the reserved reaction 
on the part of the White House, but I am 
glad that the door is being held open. In 
the same way Ambassador Bruce's re-
quest that he be g! ven time to consider 
the seven-point proposal is also under-
standable, along with his initial "yes, 
but" response. 
Nevertheless, I hope that this "straw 
in the wind" will not slip away as, I am 
· confident the 'lldlninistraJtion has no in-
tention of permitting. It seems to me that 
the President's probes for peace over the 
past several months have crea;ted this 
stirling, this movement, in the first place 
and, hopefully, out of this latest pro-
posal will come the ways and means to 
bring the war to a conclusion. The final 
decisions remain with the President, but 
all of tlS-the Congress and the people-
are, I am sure, ready and willing to sus-
tain the efforts which he makes to 
achieve a negotiated peace. 
Insofar as South Vietnam is con-
cerned, any commitments which we may 
have had to the government in Saigon 
have long since been discharged. We 
have given to the present government 
and to every predecessor government 
after the unfurtunate and tragic death 
of President Ngo Dinh Diem whatever 
support could be given for the past 17 
years. As for the election which is sched-
uled to take place in October for the 
presidency, that will be the business of 
the Vietnamese, not ours. If the outcome 
is based upon a free and open contest, 
the results can only be respected. What-
ever the outcome, our principal concern, 
at this point, it seems to me, must center 
on the American POW's and the MIA's-
the missing in action. It has been pro-
posed that we consider the s1tuation of 
these Americans in juxtaposition to a 
phased withdrawal of U.S. forces and 
that these two matters be treated apart 
from the other considerations in the 
seven-point proposal. Why not? The U.S. 
withdrawal has already been in process 
for the past 2 V2 years. Why not speed up 
the withdrawal to full completion if it 
means, reciprocally, as indicated in the 
seven-point proposal that Hanoi will be 
willing to match it with a rapid release 
of all POW's. 
Our primary obligation in this situa-
tion is to our own country and to our 
own people. That ha.s been, is, and will 
continue to be the basic consideration 
which has underlain my own position 
as a Sena-tor from Montana. In this case, 
the obligation has to do with the fate 
of the American POW's and the MIA's, 
as the administration has made clear 
many times. 
There may well be in these proposals 
of the National Liberation Front some 
"light at the end of the tunnel" for these 
men. The proposals may also contain 
light for a final peace settlement. As I 
see it, the time to find out is now. 
And, in conclu.sion, may I call to the 
attention of the Senate the latest cas-
ualty list under date of Jrune 26, 1971: 
Wounded, 300,510 Americans. 
Combat dead, 45,321 Americans. 
Noncombat dead, 9,622 Americans. 
The total casualties in this second 
most costly of a~l the wars in which we 
have been engaged amount to 355,453 
Americans as of June 26, 1971. Casual-
ties, costs, drugs sum up the price we 
have paid. It is too much. 
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